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Abstract 
We use newly-constructed individual-level data on partnership contracts in late nineteenth 
century Rio de Janeiro to examine differences between limited and unlimited liability firms and 
partners, and to assess the impact of a major institutional reform that facilitated the formation of 
joint stock companies on the terms of partnership contracts. Contrary to expectation, we find that 
most unlimited partners contributed capital and received profit shares, and most non-managing 
limited partners received salaries. Limited partners contributed more capital and received lower 
salaries and profit shares than their unlimited partners; unlimited partners in limited firms 
received more favorable terms than those in unlimited firms. Finally, we find suggestive 
evidence that the reforms reduced the extent of income smoothing for the limited partner and 
increased the average quality of unlimited liability partners in limited liability firms. These 
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1.  Introduction 
Business partnerships were a crucial organizational form during the nineteenth century, often 
outnumbering corporations by a very wide margin.
1 Moreover, despite conventional wisdom that 
emphasizes unlimited liability in partnerships as opposed to limited liability in joint stock companies, 
partners could have limited liability and partnerships with limited liability were in fact numerous.
2 
Entrepreneurs could establish partnerships where at least one partner had limited liability, known in 
Brazil as a sociedade em comandita (henceforth limited partnerships) or partnerships where no 
partners had limited liability, referred to as a sociedade em nome coletivo (henceforth unlimited 
partnerships)
3, and they could become limited or unlimited partners. Partners with unlimited liability 
worked and managed the firm in return for profit shares and salaries, and they were personally held 
liable for their firm’s liabilities above and beyond their capital contribution. Limited liability partners 
contributed capital to the firm in return for profit shares and, as we show, also sometimes salaries. 
They were not personally liable for their firms’ liabilities, and they were not allowed to take an active 
part in managing the firm or working in it. That is, limited liability partners were passive investors in 
the firm rather than active partners, although they were allowed to offer advice to the active partners 
and to monitor the firm’s finances.
4  
This paper’s main goal is to shed light on limited and unlimited partnerships by analyzing data 
assembled from a set of richly detailed contracts of business partnerships in the Brazilian archives. We 
ask: how different were limited partnerships from unlimited partnerships? How different were the 
contract terms of the limited partner from those of the unlimited partner? And how did the emergence 
of joint stock companies affect contractual relationships within partnerships?  Answers to these 
questions contribute to our understanding of the logic of partnerships as well as the effects of 
institutional reform on the organization of these firms. 
                                                 
1    Duol, “Popularity of Partnership,” p. 8, reports that partnerships accounted for 30 percent of all U.S. firms 
(including proprietorships) in non-agricultural sectors.  Lamoreaux and Rosenthal, “Corporate Governance and the Plight of 
Minority,” p. 4, report that two-thirds of multi-owner firms in U.S. manufacturing were organized as partnerships circa 
1900. Lamoreaux and Rosenthal also present figures for France where partnerships formed the bulk of new multi-owned 
enterprises during this period (with limited liability companies forming a small fraction of all partnerships). 
2   See Lamoreaux, “Constructing Firms.” 
3   We use the term “Limited Partnership”, as opposed to “Limited Liability Partnership”, in order to emphasize that 
the limited liability firms we are referring to throughout the paper have as limited partners only a subset of their partners 
(and the rest are unlimited partners). This is in contrast to the “Limited Liability Partnership”, or LLP, known to prevail 
today in the US, where all partners have limited liability and can participate in the operation of the firm. For consistency, 
we also use the term “Unlimited Partnership”, as opposed to “Unlimited Liability Partnership.” 
4   Brazil, Codigo Comercial, Art. 314, “Os socios comanditarios não podem praticar acto algum de gestão (the 
limited partners may not practice any act of management),” but can “tomar parte nas deliberações da sociedade (take part in 
the deliberations of the partnership).”  The classic annotated version of the code is Salustiano Orlando de Araujo Costa, 
Codigo Commercial do Imperio do Brazil.  Unless otherwise noted, we follow this authority in interpreting the meaning of 
specific articles of the code.        3
The complete registers of partnerships in Rio de Janeiro are available in Brazil’s National Archive 
and their analysis allows us to probe fundamental aspects of this form of business enterprise. Hundreds 
of partnerships were registered every year in the ledgers of the Junta Comercial of Rio de Janeiro.
5  
Our data suggest that these contracts brought together thousands of partners and millions of dollars in 
capital. For 1870, 1888 and 1891, we collected full information on all partnership contracts registered 
in the books, including partner-level information on salaries (usually denoted as a monthly draw on the 
current account and/or annual profits), profit shares, capital contribution, and the partners'  liability 
status.  We also matched partners with a comprehensive set of property records for Rio de Janeiro for 
1888 which provides us with an additional measure of partners’ wealth. 
The years from which we chose to collect data allow us to test the effect of the vast expansion of 
joint stock companies on the relative contractual terms (profit shares, salaries and the shares of the 
capital contributions) received by partners with and without limited liability.  Specifically, institutional 
innovation in the aftermath of the declaration of a republic in 1889 facilitated the relatively easy 
establishment of joint-stock companies.  These changes led to a large increase in the number of new 
joint-stock companies in increasingly diverse sectors of the economy.
6 At the same time, partnerships 
remained the main organizational form for smaller businesses. We test whether the average terms of 
unlimited partners in limited partnerships changed differentially after the reforms compared with the 
terms of the limited partners. Similarly, we test whether the average terms of unlimited partners in 
limited partnerships changed differentially after the financial reforms compared with the terms of 
partners in unlimited partnerships. These questions are interesting because they shed light on the 
relative economic advantages of limited vs. unlimited partnerships and the effect of  broader financial 
development (as proxied by the reforms) on these partnerships, which comprised a large swathe of the 
economy.  
Our first set of regressions compares the cross-sectional differences between limited and unlimited 
liability partners. This paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to examine the different 
contractual terms of these two types of partners. The results of these regressions suggest that, in limited 
partnerships, limited partners received lower profit shares than unlimited partners, they had lower 
                                                 
5   The Junta Comercial can be translated, roughly, as Chamber of Commerce.  However, the Junta and its tribunal 
had far more sweeping powers than its North American counterpart, including an array of judicial prerogatives and the 
ability to send merchants to jail or to ban them from business.  In this regard, we view the use of the term Chamber of 
Commerce as misleading when applied to the Brazilian case. 
6    Haber, “Financial Markets,” pp. 146-178, esp. 151-153: “The more important, long-term effect of the 
Encilhamento was that it financed the creation of large numbers of joint-stock manufacturing companies.”  Eulalia Maria 
Lahmeyer Lobo’s, História do Rio de Janeiro, two volume study of industrialization in Rio de Janeiro offers further 
support for this position.      4
salaries, and they contributed higher shares of the firm’s capital. We interpret these terms as the 
“price” investors were willing to pay for having limited liability and for not having to devote their own 
labor to the partnership.  At the same time, the limited partner often received a regular “salary” despite 
not taking an active role in managing the firm, implying that he received some insurance from the firm 
– something unavailable to investors in joint stock companies. 
We then compare the terms of the contract of unlimited partners in unlimited partnerships with 
those in limited partnerships. This analysis shows that unlimited partners in limited partnerships 
received better terms: they had lower capital contributions, higher profit shares, and higher salaries. 
These findings are consistent with the positive selection of unlimited partners into limited firms over 
unobserved (to us) dimensions such as management ability and productivity. This is unsurprising in the 
sense that investors who cannot work in the firm (limited liability partners) are more likely to trust able 
people to look after their money. 
Finally, we use a difference-in-differences approach to test how the financial reforms affected: (1) 
the limited partners (compared with unlimited partners in limited firms); and (2) the unlimited partners 
in limited partnerships (compared with unlimited partners in unlimited partnerships). We note that, 
while these reforms were a key event in 1890, they occurred in a context of other economic and 
political changes that might have affected the environment in which partnerships operated (see Section 
Two). So while the 1890 financial reforms are likely to have played the main role in the changes in 
partnership contracts, we cannot disentangle the effects of the reforms from the effects of the other 
changes occurring between 1888 and 1890. We find that limited partners after the 1890 reforms 
received lower salaries, suggesting that insurance motives may have become less important once 
limited partners could invest their money more easily in joint-stock companies.
7  Additionally, while 
                                                 
7   Note that, perhaps surprisingly, limited partners very rarely invested in multiple partnerships, at least according to 
the most complete data we have been able to evaluate.  Namely, in the 1889 city directory, firms are listed along with 
partners (including the specification of limited partner), allowing us to see whether partners in our 1888 database are 
investors in other firms during that same year.  A preliminary study, based on a manual matching process to ensure 
accuracy, suggests that in 1888 the rate of participation in multiple firms was no more than ten percent among individuals 
listed as limited partners in the 1888 partnership registries. We cross-checked partners in all existing partnerships listed in 
the city directory.  Firm names and partner names occur on different lines in the database, so it was necessary to return to 
the Almanak page image to confirm whether partners were, in fact, members of multiple firms. One reason for why partners 
tended to invest in only one partnership could be that partners’ capital contributions to their firm were most often relatively 
large shares of their overall wealth. We collected separate information on property ownership by matching property records 
with our partnership sample.  The average annual rental value of property for property owners in our sample is about 32 
1870 British pounds. A back of the envelope calculation that imputes ten times the annual rental value as the property sale 
value provides us with a measure of the value of property owned by our partners which can be added to their capital 
contributions to arrive at a rough measure of combined business and real estate wealth. It is worth pointing out that capital 
contributions formed the bulk (86%) of our measure of wealth. Another reason might be that partners generally specialized 
in a single line of business and did not want to invest in businesses they did not understand and in which they could not 
monitor the other partner.      5
the cross-sectional results already suggested that unlimited partners received better terms than limited 
partners, the difference-in-differences results suggest that unlimited partners working in limited 
liability firms received even better terms after the reform compared with unlimited partners in 
unlimited liability firms: they received higher profit shares and contributed less capital to the 
partnership.  
Other papers have studied partnerships in the nineteenth century.
8 Besides the historical 
contribution of extending the analysis of partnerships to Brazil, our paper contributes to this literature 
both by focusing the analysis on the partner level rather than the firm level, and by studying the effect 
of financial market deregulation on partnerships. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In section Two, we briefly describe the economic and institutional 
context of late-nineteenth-century Rio de Janeiro and provide a summary of the rules governing 
partnerships.  With the economic and institutional context clarified. In section Three, we describe the 
data and provide a detailed description of partnership contracts in Brazil during the latter part of the 
nineteenth century. In section Four, we describe the empirical strategy and results. Specifically, in 
section Four we first document the differences between limited and unlimited partnerships. Second, we 
study the differences in the contract terms between the limited and unlimited partners in limited firms. 
Third, we evaluate whether and to what extent unlimited partners received better terms in limited 
partnerships than in unlimited partnerships. Fourth, we focus on family firms and examine differences 
in contract terms between family members and non-family partners. Finally, we examine the effect of 
the 1890 financial reform, which introduced to entrepreneurs the option of investing their capital in 
joint stock companies, on the contract terms of limited and unlimited partners. 
 
2.  Economic and institutional background 
Brazil between 1822 and 1889 was the only long-lasting monarchy in the Western Hemisphere. For 
most of the years prior to the sweeping reforms of 1890, the Emperor of Brazil was Dom Pedro II. His 
regime, though buffeted in the early years by regional revolts, was marked by a general sense of 
stability.  As a constitutional monarch, Pedro II ruled through an appointed Council of State and an 
elected Congress.  The regime was weakened by poor performance in the Paraguayan War (1865-70) 
                                                 
8    See, e.g.: Lamoreaux and Rosenthal, “"Contractual Tradeoffs”; Lamoreaux, “Partnership Form”; Guinnane, 
Harris, Lamoreaux, and Rosenthal “Putting the Corporation in its Place”; Duol, “Next Best Thing”; Hilt and O’Banion, 
“Limited Partnership in New York"; Gomez-Galvarriato and Musacchio, “Larger Menus and Entrepreneurial Appetite”; 
Bodenhorn, “Partnership Hold-Up”; and Kessler, “Limited Liability in Context.” Also quite relevant, though not solely 
focused on partnerships is Lamoreaux, Insider Lending.      6
and struggles over the continuation of the slave system, leading eventually to a belated abolition 
decree, signed by Pedro II’s daughter, the Princess Isabel, on May 13, 1888.
9 A coup d’etat led by the 
army and backed by elements of the elite and urban middle class brought about a declaration of a 
republic on November 15, 1889.
10  This new republican regime ushered in the substantial reforms of 
the laws governing joint-stock companies, as well as the whole financial system, in 1890-91. 
Between 1850 and 1900, the city of Rio de Janeiro was transformed from a sleepy imperial capital 
into a burgeoning modern metropolis by the development of railway links to the interior, European 
immigration to the city, particularly from Portugal, and the rise of banking and joint-stock 
companies.
11  The population of the city trebled in these decades, and the volume of exports more than 
doubled.
12  Together, these developments encouraged urbanization and industrialization, which in turn 
influenced the structure of the business community, including partnerships.  
The Commercial Code of 1850, adopted by the Brazilian empire at the same time that the Atlantic 
slave trade was finally suppressed, and meant to help spur the modernization of the economy, provided 
the basic template for the formation and regulation of partnerships and other business organizations.
13  
Joint-stock companies were also considered in the original 1850 code, but these firms required a 
charter.  Chartering, however, depended on imperial government authority and very few joint-stock 
companies were formed before the 1880s.  It was only in 1882 that the chartering law was revised and 
joint-stock companies were allowed in most sectors of the economy without governmental 
permission.
14 The declaration of a republic in 1889 allowed further institutional innovation. Stephen 
Haber’s work on the cotton textile industry in Brazil shows that the institutional changes of 1889-91 
                                                 
9   For an excellent critical biography of Dom Pedro II, see Barman, Citizen Emperor. 
10 da  Costa,  The Brazilian Empire.  
11  Note that in this paper, unless otherwise stated, our unit of analysis is the city of Rio de Janeiro, not the province 
of the same name.  The city was also sometimes referred to as the Court (a Corte) of the Brazilian Empire.  The best 
overview of the modernization of Brazil during this period remains Graham’s, Britain and the Onset of Modernization in 
Brazil, 1850-1914.  For the important role of the railroads in Brazil’s economic development during the second half of the 
nineteenth century, see Summerhill, Order Against Progress. 
12   The population figure for the city of Rio de Janeiro in 1849 was 205,906; by 1872 it had increased to 274,972; 
finally, in 1890, it had risen dramatically to 522,651. First figure from Karash, Slave Life, p. 166, citing the census of the 
city conducted by Roberto Haddock Lobo; other years reported in Brazil, IBGE, Recenseamento. Export figures from Lobo, 
Historia do Rio de Janeiro, vol. 1. 
13  The articles of the Brazilian Commercial Code of 1850 and the French Commercial Code of 1807 are usually very 
similar and sometimes identical.  Beginning with the early articles regarding the right to engage in business (limits for 
minors and married women) and extending through the articles requiring businesses to maintain clear and complete account 
books, the Codes are virtually identical. The French Code, Book 1, Title 3, section 1 defines much the same menu of 
options as found in Brazil, including nearly identical rules for unlimited and limited partnerships. Source: Rodman. The 
commercial code of France.  For a good commentary on the French code during the period in question, see Leopold, The 
French Code of Commerce. 
14   Brazil,  Lei n. 3150.  This law maintained a few restrictions, including a rule that legislative approval was required 
for chartering a bank of emission and, interestingly from the perspective of partnerships, joint-stock companies involved in 
food and food provision were also restricted (art. 1, sec. 2, sub sec. 3).      7
with respect to capital markets had profound effects at the industry level.  In particular, the boom in 
credit financed a great number of new joint-stock companies in increasingly diverse sectors of the 
economy.
15 
Whereas the growth of capital markets and the number and scale of joint-stock companies was 
impressive, especially after 1890, the traditional partnership sector grew much more slowly, if at all, in 
Rio de Janeiro after 1888.  In fact, measured in constant terms, the mean value of partnerships declined 
between 1888 and 1898, precisely when the number and size of joint-stock companies was 
exploding.
16 Although addressing the declining real capitalization of partnerships by 1898 is beyond 
the scope of the present paper, we see this trend as further confirmation of the hypothesis that larger 
enterprise, and investment more generally, tended toward the joint-stock form at the expense of 
partnerships. 
Precise measurement of the weight of partnerships in the local economy is probably impossible, 
but it is likely that they accounted for the greater part of Rio de Janeiro’s manufacturing and 
warehousing and a substantial part of retail trade circa 1870.
17  By 1888, partnerships shared space 
with a rising number of joint-stock companies, and, it appears, also began to adopt contracts that 
provided at least some of the advantages of that model of business incorporation.  In order to help 
place partnerships in context, it is useful to estimate the number and value of joint-stock companies as 
a point of contrast. 
By 1886, according to one careful estimate, the market value of the companies listed on the Rio de 
Janeiro stock exchange amounted to 213,000 contos, or $80,940,000 in current US dollars.
18  In order 
to place this figure in perspective, we estimate the combined capitalization of business partnerships 
located and registered in Rio de Janeiro in 1888.  We consider the total number of partnerships extant 
in 1888 according to the city directory, approximately 2,100, and estimate a total value for all these 
partnerships by applying to all partnerships the mean value of partnerships newly registered that same 
                                                 
15    Haber, “Financial Markets,” pp. 146-178, esp. 151-153: “The more important, long-term effect of the 
Encilhamento was that it financed the creation of large numbers of joint-stock manufacturing companies.”  Lobo’s, História 
do Rio de Janeiro two volume study of industrialization in Rio de Janeiro offers further support for this position. 
16   We collected a smaller, partial sample of contracts for the year 1898.  Our aim in this regard was to see whether 
there were major changes in partnerships in the first decade of the Old Republic (1889-1930). 
17  Analysis of the listings of businesses and merchants in the Almanak Laemmert, Rio de Janeiro’s city directory, 
reveals that in 1870 there were at least 1,000 partnerships active in the city. 
18  Musacchio, “Law and Finance,” p. 66.  Note that Brazil’s currency in the nineteenth century was the mil-réis, 
written 1$000.  One thousand mil-réis equals one conto, written 1:000$000.  A conto was worth approximately 500 dollars 
in 1870 and 1888.  In 1898, after a major bout of inflation and expanding money supply, the conto was worth about 150 
dollars.      8
year.
19  The result of this calculation implies a total capitalization of all partnerships in Rio de Janeiro 
in the realm of 112,000 contos.
20 Since this value reflects the capitalization of partnerships in the city 
of Rio de Janeiro alone, the comparison with the market capitalization of the joint-stock companies is 
problematic.  Nevertheless, these rough calculations suggest the orders of magnitude of investment in 
joint-stock companies (on the Rio de Janeiro exchange) and partnerships (located in the city of Rio de 
Janeiro). 
After the declaration of a republic and the ensuing changes to the laws regarding joint-stock 
companies and capital markets more broadly, the capitalization of joint-stock companies jumped to 
671,000 contos as of 1895.
21  In real terms, total private capitalization, without counting debentures, 
grew at a rate of over 5 percent per annum during the period 1886 to 1895.  
The number of companies listed and traded on the Rio de Janeiro stock exchange rose from an 
average of 12 in the decade of the 1860s to an average of 54 by the last years of the 1880s, rising again 
to over 100 companies in the late 1890s.
22  Most of these companies were banks, insurance companies, 
and railroads—not, that is, the kind of smaller business firms associated with partnerships in our 
database.
23  The argument, therefore, is not that companies that would have been partnerships 
necessarily switched to the joint-stock form, at least not before the 1890s.  Rather, particularly in the 
1888 sample and thereafter, investors increasingly had the choice of putting some or all of their 
resources into joint-stock companies as an alternative to partnerships at a time when the growth of 
banking and infrastructure in Brazil abetted the rapid increase in the size and number of joint-stock 
companies.   
We have collected lists of shareholders and directors in joint-stock companies in Rio de Janeiro 
and have found evidence of partners who also invested in shares of public companies.  As a test of the 
                                                 
19  Note that we collected a smaller sample of 308 firms from 1888 on which we base the bulk of our analysis in this 
paper.  We lacked sufficient resources to collect full information on all 527 firms.  Instead, we collected a random sample 
of firms which ended up providing us with 308 observations, 
20  These figures measure slightly different things (market capitalization is not the same thing as the capital 
contributed by business partners), so the comparison is meant merely to suggest orders of magnitude.  The estimate of total 
capitalization of partnerships was calculated by multiplying the ratio 3.98 times 28,127 contos, the sum of capitalization of 
firms registered in 1888. The ratio 3.98 is the number of firms in the city directory divided by the number of 1888 firms in 
our dataset. It generates a number to multiply against in order to estimate the total capitalization of partnerships existing at 
that time.   
21   Musacchio, “Law and Finance,” p. 69. For a good survey of the banking sector in particular (which accounted for 
nearly two-fifths of the total market capitalization of joint-stock companies during the early 1890s, see Triner, Banking and 
Economic Development. 
22   For the number of firms listed on the exchange, see Levy, História, pp. 107, 245. 
23   Indeed, in terms of capitalization, banks, railroads, and public utilities accounted for about two-thirds of the total 
capital raised by joint-stock companies circa 1891, Levy, História, p. 164.  For a good study of the process by which 
common partnerships did at times transform into joint-stock companies (in this case in textiles), see von der Weid, O fia da 
meada, esp. pp. 31-52.      9
cross investment in partnerships and joint-stock companies, we collected a list of over 1700 
shareholders from 50 large joint-stock companies circa 1891.
24  We then compared these names with 
the names of the partners in our database.  There were 51 matches, out of over 2100 individual partner 
listings we observe in out dataset, suggesting that some individuals invested in both partnerships and 
joint-stock companies, although the number of matches is not particularly large. These cross investors 
tended to be wealthier than the average partner, and were no more or less likely than the average 
partner to be limited partners.
25  Further research will be required to ascertain the degree to which this 
subset of entrepreneurs shifted their pattern of investment toward stocks, and whether limited partners 
diversified more than unlimited partners, but at the very least we can be certain that the phenomenon of 
investment in both partnerships and joint-stock companies existed. 
Along similar lines, an analysis of estate inventories (akin to probate records) indicates that, in the 
period in question, the average proportion of decedents’ wealth in stocks and bonds rose from 11.2 
percent to 32 percent at the same time that business assets declined from 14.4 percent to 11 percent of 
inventoried wealth.  Capital that might have flowed into partnerships increasingly ended up in stocks 
and bonds as Brazil’s institutions improved and capital markets expanded.
26  Another common avenue 
for investment was land and, especially, urban property. Evidence from estate inventories recorded in 
the city of Rio de Janeiro during the 1870s and 1880s, for instance, shows that between 29 and 39 
percent of wealth was accounted for by urban real estate.
27  According to these records, as well as 
property tax rolls, the average annual return on these investments (calculated as annual rental value) 
was approximately ten percent of the market value of the property.  Partnership contracts evolved in 
response to this changing environment.  The next section takes a closer look at the details of these 
contracts and the rules that governed them. 
  
                                                 
24   Junta Comercial do Rio de Janeiro – Sociedades Anonimas, Livro 61 – 1891 – Codigo de Fundo: 46 – Secao de 
Guarda. Seven out of the 50 joint-stock companies in our list had no shareholders listed. 
25  The mean capital of the partnerships from which the matches were obtained was an elevated sum of 209,015 1870 
Mil-Reis (the mean capital contribution of the partner who also owned stock in the sample was 60,240 1870 Mil-Reis), 
indicating that cross investors tended to be significantly wealthier than the mean partner. Approximately a third of the 
partners who were found to own stock in the sample were limited partners, which is in rough proportion to the number of 
limited partners in our overall sample.  However, when looking at the proportion of limited partners by individual years in 
our sample, we observe a steady increase in the proportion of shareholders found to be limited partners.  In particular, in 
1870, only 1 out of the 9 partners identified as shareholders was a limited partner, while in 1888 this figure increases to 3 
out of 18, and in 1891, 11 out of the 24 partners identified as shareholders were limited partners. Note that the increase in 
the absolute number of partners identified as shareholders over the years is reasonable, as the shareholder information in 
use is from 1891. 
26   Post mortem estate inventories, Arquivo Nacional, Rio de Janeiro.  1868-73 N = 87; 1885-1888 N = 143.  Further 
detail regarding the estate inventory data reported in Frank, Dutra’s World, p. 88. 
27   Ibid., p. 88.      10
3.  Data  
Formal business partnerships were required to register with the Junta Commercial in Rio de 
Janeiro.  Registration served two purposes.  First, it allowed the state to regulate and tax businesses in 
accordance with the Commercial Code of 1850.  Second, and more importantly for our purposes, it 
allowed individuals to pool their resources in larger enterprises under the discipline of the rules of the 
Junta.  Registration as a formal partnership carried consequences for relations among partners as well 
as for relations between the partnerships and outside creditors.  Recent work by Aldo Musacchio 
demonstrates that, in the nineteenth century, the Commercial Code was enforced vigorously when 
partners committed fraud or otherwise attempted to avoid their obligations.
28 
Over the period in question, there were three main types of business partnership in Rio de Janeiro 
(and Brazil more broadly): 1) sociedades em nome coletivo (common, unlimited liability); 2) 
sociedades em comandita (limited liability); and 3) sociedades de capital e indústria (capital and 
industry, with or without limited liability). This paper focuses on the first two types since they 
comprised the vast majority of all partnerships and are also more analytically tractable.   For the sake 
of readability and consistency, we will refer to these forms as “unlimited” and “limited” partnerships.  
Unlimited partnerships predominated, although this form declined relative to limited partnerships over 
the period covered by our data.  In common (unlimited) partnerships, each member took on unlimited 
liability.  The limited liability form of partnership was formed when one or more “silent” partners, 
protected by limited liability, provided capital to an enterprise to be managed by one or more active 
partners with unlimited liability.
29   
The archival source of the data used in this paper is housed in the National Archive of Brazil in Rio 
de Janeiro.  The archive itself consists of the registry books maintained by the Junta Commercial.  
These books contain detailed contracts regarding new, renewed or modified, or dissolved firms for all 
registered partnerships in the city of Rio de Janeiro.  Our data collection proceeded as follows: for 
1870, we collected full information on all partnership contracts registered in the books pertaining to 
that year (books 638-640). Some firms registered in the books for 1870 were actually initiated in 1869; 
we collected these as well.  We also noted the incidence of partnership contracts outside the city, but 
did not collect full information on these cases.  Finally, we noted basic information about each case of 
dissolution throughout the year.   For 1888, our procedure was the same.   We collected all of the 
                                                 
28   Musacchio, “Law and Finance,” pp. 81-82, sec. 4.4.  For contemporary commentary on the Commercial Code and 
a clear exposition of the rules regarding payment of creditors and rights and duties of partners, see Codigo Commercial, 
esp. pp. 361-477. 
29   Note that there were also partnerships of “industry,” which joined together partners with capital with partners who 
offered their skilled labor.  In many cases, the “industry” partnerships were also set up with limited liability.      11
information on contracts regarding firms within the city of Rio de Janeiro (in books 204-217) and the 
supplemental partial information regarding firms outside of the city and dissolutions.   As with the 
1870 data, the initiation date of firms in the 1888 books included some firms started in 1887.  Finally, 
we collected data on firms in 1891 from books 244, 245, 248, 252, and 254.  These data cover firms 
with initiation dates ranging from December 1890 through September 1891.  As with the other years, 
we also collected abbreviated information from these books regarding firms outside of the city and 
dissolutions. 
A detailed analysis of the specific clauses underpinning partnership contracts reveals sophisticated 
and sometimes complex arrangements.  The first clauses are generic, stipulating the names of the 
partners, the form the contract would take, the type of enterprise, the address, and the duration of the 
enterprise.
30  There are scores of different kinds of enterprises listed in the contracts, ranging from 
bakeries and tailoring shops up to major import-export houses.  In order to assess the effects of 
partnership characteristics according to a specific and very important and common type of enterprise, 
we use a dummy variable (broker commission) for brokerages and commission houses in the 
regression analysis.
31  These were among the largest, most complex, and most highly capitalized firms 
in the database.   
Next are clauses indicating the capitalization of the partnership, the amount each partner brought to 
the table, and the nature of their contribution to the firm. Among artisan and retail establishments, the 
capital often included equipment and stock provided by one or more partners.  After specifying the 
distribution of capital, contracts usually stipulated the rules for the use of the firm name in business 
and private dealings.  Many contracts forbade the use of the firm name in private matters or in business 
affairs outside of the narrowly defined purposes of the firm.  In some contracts, only one partner was 
given the right to use the firm name in the course of business—for instance, in signing contracts for 
goods or services.
32 
All contracts included a clause indicating which partner or partners would be in charge of 
maintaining the firm’s account ledger.  The ledger was to be updated regularly, to include all relevant 
data and correspondence, and to be used at the end of each year to audit the balance of the firm, 
including detailed information on all assets and liabilities.
33  And, as if this was not enough to dissuade 
                                                 
30   Codigo Comercial, art. 5. 
31   For an extended study of these firms, see Joseph Sweigart, Coffee Factorage and the Emergence of a Brazilian 
Capital Market, 1850-1888 (New York: Garland, 1987). 
32   Lamoreaux and Rosenthal, “Legal Regime,” esp, tables 2-4, explore the importance of such clauses limiting the 
activities of one or more partners.  
33   Codigo Comercial, art. 10, sec. 4.      12
cheating, merchants were required by the Commercial Code to maintain a detailed daily log of their 
transactions.
34  Failure to produce these books, in the case of a legal proceeding against the merchant, 
could result in a stint in prison.
35  In general, the larger the firm, the more detailed were the restrictions 
on the activities of various partners.
36  The contracts we studied in detail generally set forth either 
annual or monthly draws that the partners could make on the current account for personal expenses.  
These amounts were referred to as salaries or “draws” in the contracts both for unlimited partners who 
worked in the firms and for limited partners who did not.
37  As a whole, the vast majority (94%) of 
partners in our sample were entitled to such draws (the figure was 97% for unlimited partners and 89% 
for limited partners).  The average annual salary figure was about 2630$ 1870 mil-réis.
38   
It is unclear to what extent the draws were contractually guaranteed amounts or whether their 
provision was conditioned on the firm’s performance and its ability to allocate these payments out of 
its profits.  In the former case, the draws would be regarded as ongoing expenses borne by the firm 
over the course of its fiscal year (such as salaries are treated in accounting books).  Unfortunately, we 
do not observe accounting ledgers, actual profits for the firms studied, or the actual draws provisioned 
by the firms.  Nevertheless, we note that the majority (69%) of the contracts for which we observe 
salary data specify draw amounts on a monthly basis, rather than an annual basis.
39  Given that profits 
are only assessed at the end of the fiscal year, this is an indication that the draws were treated as a fixed 
expense, independent of annual profit results, and it therefore seems reasonable to assume that they 
had more of a guaranteed nature to them.  At the same time, the majority (66%) of the contracts for 
which we observe salary data also specify the draw amounts as an upper bound for the total amount of 
money each partner can withdraw for their personal expenses,
40 thus allowing the partners flexibility to 
negotiate the exact amount to be withdrawn.  Additionally, in partnership dissolution documentation 
                                                 
34   Ibid., arts. 12 and 13. 
35   Ibid., art. 20. 
36   Lamoreaux and Rosenthal, “Legal Regime,” tables 2-4, pp. 42-44, find the same pattern in French partnerships. 
37   The language regarding these payments varied in the contracts.  Some contracts referred to the payment as salary 
(salário, ordenado, etc.) whereas most contracts merely stated that a given partner had the right to withdraw a certain 
amount from the partnership per month (or year) for personal expenses against his current account and/or his share of 
annual profits. 
38   Brazil experienced significant inflation during the last decades of the nineteenth century.  Unfortunately, there is 
no truly reliable price index for Brazil during this period.  Given a variety of imperfect options, and following the example 
of Summerhill, Order Against Progress, 86, we use a wholesale price index for Brazil to deflate the values in our dataset.  
Luis Catão, “A new wholesale price index for Brazil,” Revista Brasileira de Economia 46:4 (1992), 519-533, esp. p. 530.  
The index values for the relevant years of this study are: 71.57 (1870), 55.96 (1888), and 81.86 (1891). 
39   Broken down by years, 86%, 88%, and 42% of the contracts observed with salary data specify monthly payments 
for 1891, 1888, and 1870, respectively.  
40   We specified such an occurrence when the term “up to” appeared in the salary amount discussions in the 
contracts. Broken down by years, 72%, 78%, and 52% of the contracts observed with salary data specify the payments as 
upper bounds for 1891, 1888, and 1870, respectively.      13
we have obtained,
41 we find evidence that occasionally a partnership would dissolve without its 
partners receiving the salary stipulated in the firm’s contract.  It thus seems that while the draws were 
not fully guaranteed, they can largely be thought of as routine monthly payments.  For unlimited 
partners we interpret these clauses as salaries; for limited partners the interpretation is more complex 
since limited partners did not (and legally could not) work in the firm except on a passive 
advisory/monitoring basis.  For limited partners, therefore, these clauses are perhaps best thought of as 
a sort of legally enforceable insurance mechanism that reduced the volatility of earnings.  
Among smaller contracts, the draw tended to be high relative to capitalization, suggesting that 
these firms probably provided their partners with their primary source of income and that these 
payments were akin to salaries.  Larger partnerships, to be sure, had higher draws in nominal terms, 
but quite a bit lower draws relative to capitalization.  It seems likely that these partners expected to 
derive some of their income from the division of profits, which was accounted for separately in the 
contracts, rather than from a regular salary.  Earnings in a form of profit shares were nearly universal 
in our sample with 99% of the partners receiving a positive profit share.  
The contracts also specified the precise capital contribution made by each partner. As with profit 
sharing, capital contributions were nearly universal in our sample across all years, with more than 95% 
of the partners contributing some capital to the enterprise.  In fact, 95% of unlimited partners made 
some capital contribution to the firm, although, as we shall see, their average contributions were lower 
than those made by limited partners. 
Finally, all contracts contained clauses dealing with the event of the death of a partner or the 
dissolution of the partnership for other reasons prior to the end of the contracted period.  In most cases, 
these clauses merely stipulated that the procedures of the Junta Commercial and the Commercial Code 
would be followed.
42  Most contracts included a provision that disputes be settled by arbitration, 
sometimes citing the relevant paragraphs in the Commercial Code in this connection.  Some contracts 
included more creative clauses regarding the potential dissolution of the partnership.  These clauses 
included monetary penalties for early withdrawal and, in one instance, a precocious non-compete 
provision in which the defecting partner was barred from opening a competing shop in the same 
                                                 
41   Junta Comercial, Livros de Registros n. 204-05 (1888) and 245 (1891), ANRJ. 
42    By including these clauses, contracts further reduced the degree of uncertainty associated with problems of 
untimely dissolution, see Codigo Comercial, arts. 344-353. The default position was one in which a complete inventory of 
the firm’s assets was undertaken within 15 days of the dissolution and, after paying creditors in the order determined by the 
code, the remaining assets were divided among the partners according to the proportion of their capital contribution.  
During this process, the partner in charge of the liquidation was required to provide the other partners with a monthly report 
regarding the process of the liquidation.      14
neighborhood.
43  It is important to note that, in the absence of judicial intervention, untimely 
dissolution was only permitted in cases where all partners agreed to it or when the firm was constituted 
without a set time limit.
44 
The contracts also indicated how profits and other responsibilities were to be divided.  There was a 
wide variation in profit sharing across firms in all years.  In a general sense, profit shares were strongly 
correlated with capital contributions; however, there was considerable remaining variation even after 
accounting for capital shares. These salary setting and profit sharing clauses, along with stipulations 
regarding rights to sign papers in the company name, served to reduce uncertainty and inhibit 
misconduct. 
Most partnerships stipulated a specific period of association, although a substantial number of 
partnerships, increasing in proportion over the period studied, were registered without limit of time.  
Every three-to-five years, most partnerships needed to be renewed or unwound.  As we shall see, there 
were several reasons for firms to adopt fixed time horizons.  The most important of these was that 
time-delimited firms were not construed legally as “at will” partnerships and were thus less susceptible 
to untimely dissolution.  Partnerships with open time horizons could be dissolved at the whim of any 
individual partner, whereas without judicial intervention time-delimited partnerships could only be 
dissolved in the event that all partners agreed to dissolution.
 45 
Table 1 provides partnership-level summary statistics of the main information we coded, both for 
all years pooled together, and for 1870, 1888 and 1891 separately. We collected information on 263 
partnerships in 1870, 215 partnerships in 1888, and 188 partnerships in 1891.
46 The tables reveal that 
most partnerships were unlimited liability, but the percentage of limited liability firms increased from 
17% in 1870 to a third in 1888 and 1891. Most partnerships had two or three partners, but partnership 
size increased between 1888 and 1891. The average total capital of partnerships in our data is 69,864 
1870 Mil-Reis. The total capital increased substantially between 1888 and 1891 with the average 
amounting to 102,592 1870 Mil-Reis by 1891. The capital contributions of each partner to the 
partnership were quite even, with a Herfindahl index for capital contributions of about a half in all 
                                                 
43   Contrato, Santiago & Alves, Livros de Registros, Junta Comercial, ANRJ. 
44   Codigo Comercial, art. 335, sec. 3. 
45   Prior to the end of the stipulated contract period, expulsion of partners was restricted and required a judicial 
finding of moral turpitude, incapacity, or the like.  Codigo Comercial, art. 336. It comes as no surprise that family 
partnerships were overrepresented among firms with open time horizons: the danger of “at will” defection from a family 
firm must have been lower. 
46   The number of partnerships reflects our firm-level data set after dropping all firms that had at least one of the 
variables in our analysis with an empty value. This amounts to dropping 12, 17, and 0 firms for 1870, 1888, and 1891, 
respectively.      15
years. About a third of all partnerships in 1870 were based on equal sharing of profits, but this fraction 
increased to 52% in 1888, and fell slightly to 46% in 1891. Almost all partnerships in 1870 stipulated a 
time-delimitation clause described above, but by 1888, 24% of partnerships did not have this clause. 
About 16% of partnerships were family firms and this number did not vary much over the period under 
study. About two-thirds of all partners in 1870 and 1888 were Portuguese, but this number dropped to 
44% in 1891.  The relatively high fraction of Portuguese partners is reflective of the strong hold that 
the Portuguese merchant community continued to exercise over the economy of Rio de Janeiro, a 
reflection of Brazil’s colonial past. The Portuguese merchant community was fairly large (it formed 
the majority of merchant businessmen through the 1870s) and was a cohesive group. Relevantly, there 
was a historical divide between this community and the Brazilian-born merchant community.  We thus 
include a variable indicating whether the partner is Brazilian rather than Portuguese to examine 
whether these tensions caused the contract terms of Portuguese partners to be different.  
Table 2 provides firm-level summary statistics, by firm type. We observe 177 limited firms and 
489 unlimited firms. The table reveals that limited firms had, on average, a larger number of partners 
than unlimited firms, greater capital contribution, and less concentration of the capital contribution 
shares amongst the partners. Additionally, while limited firms were more likely than unlimited firms to 
be family firms and have a smaller fraction of Portuguese partners, they were less likely than unlimited 
firms to be based on equal sharing. Lastly, limited firms were more likely to be brokerage firms than 
unlimited firms, while unlimited firms were more like to operate in the dry goods industry than limited 
firms. 
Table 3 provides partner-level summary statistics of the main information we coded, both for all 
years pooled together, and for 1870, 1888 and 1891 separately. These are the partners in the 
partnerships we collected (and described above). We collected information on 545 partners in 1870, 
488 partners in 1888 and 443 partners in 1891.
47 Based on a name matching algorithm we found that 
fewer than 5% of our partners participated in multiple partnerships.
48  The fraction of limited partners 
increased over time in our sample, with only 6% of partners having limited liability in 1870, but 15% 
and 17% of partners having limited liability in 1888 and 1891, respectively. The fraction of partners 
making positive capital contributions remained uniformly high throughout the period (97% of all 
partners made positive capital contributions averaged over the three years of data) as did the fraction of 
                                                 
47  We exclude from our analysis all partners with a missing value for one of the variables of interest. This is in order 
to ensure consistency of the sample across all variations of the regression analysis. This amounts to dropping 95, 85, and 73 
partners for 1870, 1888, and 1891, respectively. Including these partners in the regressions for which they did not have 
missing values did not change our results substantially. 
48   Note that this is a lower bound since our sample is a subset of all extant partnerships.      16
partners receiving a profit share, with 99% of all partners receiving a share (averaged over 1888 and 
1891).  Unfortunately, we do not have data on profit shares and wealth for 1870. Finally, for the 
purposes of the analysis, we also define profit shares relative to a reference point of equal sharing.  We 




⎡ ⎤ − ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
 where  i s  is the share of profits 
received by partner i and N is the number of partners in the firm. It measures the deviation from equal 
sharing and is equal to zero when profits are divided equally.  It is positive when the partner gets more 
than an equal share and it is negative when the partner gets less than an equal share. We similarly 
define normalized capital share to create a measure of the share of a partner’s capital contribution that 
is not mechanically related to firm size. 
 
4.  Empirical strategy and results 
We proceed in five steps.  First, we seek to quantitatively document the differences between 
limited and unlimited partnerships.  Second, we study the differences in the contract terms between the 
limited and unlimited partners in limited firms. Third, we evaluate whether and to what extent 
unlimited partners received better contract terms in limited partnerships than in unlimited partnerships.  
Fourth, we analyze differences between family members and non-family partners in family firms.  
Finally, we examine how all of these differences changed after the 1890 reforms that provided 
entrepreneurs with the option of investing in joint-stock companies. 
 
4.1 The variables predicting whether a partnership had limited liability 
Our analysis begins with firm-level OLS and probit regressions where the dependent variable takes 
the value 1 if the firm is limited liability. The limited liability structure may mitigate the potential 
negative effect on the limited partner of opportunistic behavior on the part of the unlimited partner by 
placing an upper bound on potential losses. It also increases the costs to the unlimited partner of 
opportunistic behavior because there is at least one partner who does not share the burden if the firm 
fails.  A limited liability structure could thus have been preferred in cases where other mechanisms that 
reduce opportunistic behavior were less effective. For example, mutual monitoring to reduce 
opportunistic behavior could have been easier in small partnerships, so that small partnerships could 
rely on monitoring and might have had less need for the limited liability option to reduce opportunistic 
behavior.
49 Conversely, larger firms, where monitoring was more difficult, might have been more 
                                                 
49            For a discussion of the determinants of equality and the role of group size, see Abramitzky, “The Limits of      17
likely to adopt limited liability.  
Table 4 presents the results of this analysis. In columns 1 and 2, we pool the data across all years. 
Columns 3-5 present results from regressions run separately for 1870, 1888, and 1891 respectively.  
The regressions suggest a general increase in the fraction of limited liability firms between 1870 and 
1888, and a further increase in that fraction between 1888 and 1891. Another robust finding suggested 
by this table is that partnerships with more partners tended to be limited firms, either suggesting that 
not that many people were required to run the firms, or that trust issues as discussed above played a 
role in partnership contracts. Other findings are that partnerships with a higher fraction of Portuguese 
were less likely to have limited liability when looking at the partnerships for all years, but this 
relationship was weaker in individual years.
50 Capital contributions were more concentrated in the 
hands of a few partners in limited partnerships than in unlimited partnerships (although this 
relationship is only significant for 1888). Limited partnerships are not associated with significantly 
higher or lower total capital (controlling for the number of partners). Additionally, limited firms were 
not more or less associated with equal sharing, time delimitation clauses, or being family firms. In 
1891, limited partners were more associated with broker firms, but this relationship does not seem to 
hold for 1888 or 1870. In summary, over this time period limited partnerships were somewhat larger 
than unlimited partnerships, but did not seem to be different along several other contract characteristics 
including  (per partner) capitalization. 
        
4.2 Limited partnerships: differences in the contract terms between the limited and unlimited 
partners  
Next, in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, we carry out a series of partner-level regressions with the aim of 
studying (1) whether partners who had limited liability received higher profits, earned higher salaries, 
or contributed more capital than unlimited partners in limited firms; and (2) whether unlimited liability 
partners in limited firms received higher profits, earned higher salaries, or contributed more capital 
than their counterparts in unlimited firms.  In all regressions we include a set of control variables that 
comprise a set of firm-level variables such as total firm capital, the number of partners
51, whether the 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Equality”. 
50   Portuguese partners were somewhat different from non-Portuguese. They tended to belong to smaller partnerships 
and earn somewhat higher salaries.  However, they were not more likely to belong to family firms or to limited firms or to 
be limited partners. 
51  Note that the coefficient on the number of partners in partner-level regressions is mechanically close to zero and is 
thus not presented. Specifically, in a univariate regression of normalized capital (profit) shares on partnership size using a 
sample comprising all partners, the coefficient on partnership size will be zero by construction. Indeed, the coefficient on 
partnership size for unlimited firms is close to zero in all regressions that include all partners from unlimited firms.      18
firm existed in any prior form, as well as whether a firm was a brokerage firm--defined roughly as 
firms listed to be primarily working on commission and consignment.  We also control for a set of 
partner-level variables including nationality and whether the partner was one of two or more family 
members in the firm. Because profit shares, salaries and capital contribution are jointly determined, we 
also include profit shares, capital, and salaries received as right hand side variables when they are not 
being used as left hand side variables. We do not attempt to account for the simultaneity and so these 
regressions are best interpreted as best linear predictions.  For symmetry, when the dependent variable 
is measured in 1870 Mil-Reis (salary), we control for the capital contribution in 1870 Mil-Reis, but 
when the dependent variable is a share (profit share), we control for the capital share. For robustness, 
we also include one specification where we predict salary and control for the capital share. 
Specifically, we compare the (normalized) share of profits, the salaries, and the (normalized) share 
of capital contributions of the limited and unlimited partners in limited partnerships. We run partner-
level OLS and quantile (median) regressions where the alternative dependent variables are the 
partner’s normalized profit share (Table 5), his log of salary (Table 6), and his normalized capital share 
(Table 7), and the main explanatory variable is whether the partner had limited liability.  
The regressions pool observations from the years 1888 and 1891. We also ran specifications that 
included wealth, as proxied by a partner’s rental holdings culled from the Rio property records as a 
control and the results were very similar to those presented here and so we omit them.
52  The first few 
columns of each table present results from OLS regressions with and without various sets of controls, 
the second to last column presents results from a median regression, and the last column presents 
results from the OLS regression with partnership fixed effects. In the latter, the source of identification 
is within-partnership, i.e. whether within the firm the limited partner differs from the unlimited one in 
profit share, salary and capital contribution.  In all the regressions (except for the median), we compute 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors and allow for intra-firm correlation in the error terms.  
Tables 5-7 show that in limited partnerships, limited partners had worse terms than their unlimited 
counterparts, namely limited partners had lower profit shares, lower salaries and higher capital 
contributions than their unlimited counterparts.  Limited partners were the primary investors in the 
partnership. In return for limited liability and not taking part in any active management, the limited 
                                                                                                                                                                       
However, the coefficient on partnership size for limited firms in these regressions (captured by the interaction between 
partnership size and firm type) need not be zero since we are only considering a subset of all partners in limited firms. 
52    The coefficient on wealth was generally small and statistically insignificant, except for in the regressions 
predicting profit shares when comparing unlimited partners across firm types, where higher wealth is associated with higher 
profit shares. This could be because wealthier people contribute assets to the firm that we do not see, or that they have high 
unobservable (to us) skills, or maybe greater wealth creates more outside options through more connections and just sheer 
attractiveness, and thus generates greater bargaining power.      19
partner contributed a higher share of the capital and received a lower profit share and a lower salary. 
That is, the lower profit share, the lower salary and the higher capital contribution can be viewed as the 
"price" for getting limited risk and not being required to manage or work in the firm. 
A somewhat surprising finding is that the limited partner got some of his return in the form of a 
“salary” (as it is referred to in the contract) despite not taking an active role in managing the firm. The 
salary (or capital draw) clauses can be viewed as clauses that determine dividend policy in order to 
protect the limited partners from the lock-in of their capital. This finding may imply that the limited 
liability partners received some insurance from the firm (an insurance they could not get in joint stock 
companies) to protect their investments against very low profits or having a lazy or incompetent 
partner. 
Other factors determined partners’ salaries, profit shares and the shares of capital contributions. In 
particular, profit shares were strongly predictive of both salaries and shares of capital contributions, so 
that a higher profit share was associated with both a higher salary and a higher share of capital 
contributions. In general, larger partnerships (i.e. partnerships with more partners) paid lower salaries 
and partners made larger capital contributions. Finally, it does not appear that Portuguese partners 
received different terms than the native Brazilians in limited firms. However, Portuguese partners did 
receive higher salaries in firms with a larger share of Portuguese (regressions not shown).  
 
4.3 Differences in contract terms between the unlimited partners in limited vs. unlimited 
partnerships 
In this section, we compare the salaries, and the shares of profits and capital contributions of the 
unlimited partners in limited vs. unlimited partnerships. Specifically, we run partner-level OLS 
regressions where the dependent variables are the unlimited partner’s (normalized) profit share (Table 
8), his log of salary (Table 9), and his (normalized) share of the capital contribution (Table 10). The 
main explanatory variable of interest is a dummy for whether the unlimited partner was in a limited 
partnership (as opposed to an unlimited partnership). The columns in each table are as in Tables 5-7, 
described in the previous section, excluding the fixed effects regression column, as our variable of 
interest does not vary at the partner level within firms and can not therefore be included in such a 
regression.    
The tables suggest that, compared with unlimited partners in unlimited partnerships, unlimited 
partners in limited partnerships contributed a lower share of the overall capital, received higher profit 
shares, and higher salaries (and note that the median regression standard errors may be underestimated 
since we are not allowing for intra-firm correlation in the errors). These findings are consistent with      20
positive selection of unlimited partners to limited firms. That is, unlimited partners in limited firms 
were “better” than those in unlimited firms as reflected by their higher shares of profits, higher salaries, 
and lower shares of capital contributions. This is to be expected if limited partners could identify more 
productive unlimited partners and enter partnerships with them. Alternatively, it could be that 
unlimited partners in limited firms had to bear more risk because the limited partner had limited 
liability, and therefore required higher incentives. Finally, it could be that unlimited partners were 
required to work harder in limited firms, so that the better terms they received were merely 
compensation for their greater efforts.  
 
4.4 Family firms 
In this section, we test whether there were systematic differences in contract terms between family 
members and non-family members in family firms. One possibility is that family members looked out 
for each other’s interests and thus got better terms (higher salaries, higher profit shares and lower 
shares of capital contribution). Alternatively, it could be that family members in family firms were the 
main investors, and they hired non-family members to work for their firms, in which case we expect 
family members to contribute more capital than non-family members to the firms.  
Specifically, we focus on family firms and compare the contract terms of family members vs. non-
family partners in the sample of 112 family firms in our data.
53 Most of these firms involve brothers, 
sons, or cousins. Table 11 presents the partner-level regressions where the dependent variables are as 
stated above. These tables suggest that family members received similar terms to non-family members, 
that is family members did not receive substantially different profit shares or salaries, and they did not 
contribute more or less capital than non-family members. We also compared family firms to non-
family firms along other observable dimensions; we did not find any substantive results, and so omit 
those results here. 
 
4.5 The effect of the 1890 financial reforms on limited and unlimited partners: difference in 
differences  
In this section, we test whether the 1890 financial reforms that significantly expanded the option of 
investing in joint stock companies differentially affected the limited and unlimited partners in limited 
                                                 
53   Note that we constructed the family firm variable using a very conservative method of matching surnames among 
partners.  We discounted matches of very common surnames unless we had further corroboration of a family relationship 
(e.g., the firm name included mention of family relations, such as & sons).  A potential weakness in our method would arise 
in cases where family connections cannot be drawn according to surnames, such as in-law relationships.  On this basis, our 
analysis should be seen as an examination of a large number, but not the entire universe, of family firms.      21
partnerships.  In addition, we test whether these reforms differed with respect to unlimited partners 
who worked in limited vs. unlimited firms. We expected the reform to affect limited and unlimited 
partners differently because the reform radically increased the investment opportunity (joint stock) for 
investors thereby providing an additional avenue for investment for limited partners. It is unclear, 
however, which type of partner is expected to benefit more from these reforms. It could be that a 
limited partner will now enter a partnership only if he is able to find an exceptionally talented 
unlimited partner, and otherwise he will just invest in the stock market, an option previously 
unavailable. This would imply that unlimited partners in limited firms post reform could be expected to 
be more productive than before the reforms. Thus, given that the cross sectional regressions (Tables 8-
10) suggest better terms for the unlimited partner in the limited firm compared with the unlimited 
partner in an unlimited firm, we should expect to see these differences in contract terms be even 
greater post reform. At the same time, because the limited partner was the main investor, we could 
expect the bargaining power of limited partners post reform to increase, and their contract terms to thus 
improve post reform (relative to unlimited partners). On the other hand, we could expect investors to 
be willing to take more risk in partnerships because post reform they could diversify their portfolio 
better thorough the stock market. It thus remains an empirical question whether the reform improved 
the relative terms of the limited or the unlimited partner.  
We use a difference-in-differences approach to examine this question. That is, we compare partners 
in limited and unlimited partnerships before and after the reforms. The following table illustrates how 
we test for whether the reforms affected the limited and unlimited partners in limited partnerships 
differently, but the same strategy applies for testing the effect of the reforms on unlimited partners in 
limited partnerships compared with unlimited partners in unlimited partnerships: 
 
Sample: limited partnerships  1888 1891 
Limited liability partners  Y1  Y2 
Unlimited liability partners  Y3  Y4 
 
where Y1 is the mean (or median) normalized profit share, log of salary, normalized share of the total 
capital contribution, or total capital contribution in contos of limited liability partners in 1888 (pre-
reform), and Y2 is the corresponding quantity for limited liability partners in 1891 (post-reform). 
Similarly Y3 and Y4 are the mean (or median) log of salaries, profits shares, or shares of the capital      22
contributions of unlimited liability partners pre and post reform. 
The difference-in-differences is ((Y4-Y3)-(Y2-Y1)) or, equivalently, ((Y4-Y2)-(Y3-Y1)). The 
difference-in-differences estimate is the change in outcomes (salaries, profit shares or capital 
contributions) that occurs in the limited liability partners group that is on top of changes that occur in 
the unlimited liability partners group over the same period. The estimate simultaneously controls for 
both time trends (Y2-Y1) and time-invariant differences between the two groups (Y3-Y1). 
Specifically, we run the following OLS regression: 
01 2 3 ' Y Post LimitedPartner PostLimitedPartner X β ββ β δ ε =+ + + + +  
where Post is a dummy variable for the year 1891, LimitedPartner is a dummy variable for whether a 
partner has limited liability, and PostLimitedPartner is the interaction between these two variables. 
The coefficient of interest is  3 β - did limited partners post reform get better contract terms relative to 
the unlimited partners in limited partnerships?   
It is important to point out that such a strategy cannot control for differential time trends in the two 
types of firm.  As a potential check, we explore whether any differential time trends existed before the 
reforms by looking at data from 1870 and repeat the above regression for pre-reform data only. 
Specifically we use data from 1870 and 1888, “pretending” that the reforms occurred sometime in 
between those years. We expect  3 β  to be zero in these regressions, unless the terms for unlimited and 
limited partners were on different time trends.   
Finally, we note that since we are obtaining identification off time trends and the financial reforms 
were part of a larger set of major changes in the economic regime, our results capture the net effects of 
these different policy changes and we cannot determine the relative contributions of different policies 
to the changes in contract terms. However, absent any data on the channels through which these 
reforms affected policy, the reduced form results presented here are a useful first approximation to the 
effects of the reforms on partnership contracts.  
 
4.5.1 Limited partnerships: limited partner vs. unlimited partner 
This section tests how the difference in profit shares, salaries, and capital contributions between the 
limited and unlimited partners in limited firms changed after the 1890 reforms. 
Table 12 presents results from these regressions using data from the years just before (1888) and 
just after (1891) the reforms.       23
The regressions suggest that compared with the unlimited partners, the salaries of the limited 
partners deteriorated post reform, suggesting that insurance might have become a less important 
motive for them. The regressions also suggest that the reforms had little or no effect on the relative 
profit shares and capital shares of limited partners. 
Table 13 presents results of these regressions for pre-reform data (1870 and 1888) to test for 
differences in pre-existing trends. These tables suggest that there were no significant differences in 
pre-reform trends in salaries and capital contributions of limited partners compared with unlimited 
partners, so that the lower salaries post reforms were likely an effect of the reform rather than pre-
existing differences in trends.  
 
4.5.2  Unlimited partners in limited vs. unlimited partnerships 
This section tests how the difference in salaries, profit shares and capital contributions between the 
unlimited partners in limited firms and those in unlimited firms changed after the 1890 reforms. 
Table 14 presents results from these regressions using data from the years just before (1888) and 
just after (1891) the reforms.  The table suggests that the difference in terms between unlimited 
partners in limited firms and unlimited partners in unlimited firms increased post-reform, with 
unlimited partners in limited firms receiving even better terms post reform than their counterparts in 
unlimited firms. Specifically, the profit shares of unlimited partners in limited firms vs. unlimited firms 
increased post reforms and their capital contributions decreased. These results may suggest that limited 
partners became more “picky” post reforms, perhaps because they now could invest their money in the 
stock market, and they only entered partnerships with exceptionally productive unlimited partners. 
Alternatively, it could be that unlimited partners were expected to do more work or to take more risks 
in limited partnerships post reform, so that their better terms simply reflect additional compensation for 
these additional activities.  
Table 15 presents results of these placebo regressions for pre-reform data (1870 and 1888) to test 
for differences in pre-existing trends. It is worth pointing out that we do not present partnership fixed 
effects estimates for this case because there are very few cases in the data of multiple unlimited 
partners in limited liability firms. This table suggests that these results do not just reflect different pre-
reforms trends, because there were no significant differences in salaries or capital contributions of 
limited partners compared with unlimited partners between 1870 and 1888.  
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5.  Conclusions 
Several key results emerge from our partner-level analysis of firms in Rio de Janeiro. By shifting 
the frame of analysis from firms to partners, we are able to begin to shed light on the logic of 
partnership from within the firm at the level of individual partners.  This analysis is possible owing to 
the numerous detailed partnership contracts registered with the Junta Commercial in Rio de Janeiro.   
Our most important findings cluster in three areas of interest: the contract terms of the limited 
liability partner, the contract terms of the unlimited liability partner, and the effect of a major 
institutional reform on the relative contract terms of the two.   
First, we find that capital contributions were near universal for all partners, irrespective of liability 
status.  This is interesting since it suggests an attempt to tie the incentives of the unlimited partners 
with their firm’s profitability insofar as profit shares were generally calculated on the basis of their 
capital contributions. Second, we find that more than 60% of all limited liability partners received 
fixed periodical payments from their partnerships.  This was referred generally as a draw in the 
partnership records and was not distinguished in any way from the draw of the unlimited liability 
partners.  Note, however, that limited liability partners were forbidden by law to participate in the 
running of the firm.  Therefore, we interpret this “salary” as an income smoothing device for the 
limited liability partner. We next find that limited liability partners obtained lower profit shares and 
lower salaries than did unlimited partners; at the same time, limited partners contributed more capital 
to their firms.  We argue that this should be interpreted as the price investors were willing to pay for 
the protection of limited liability and the related fact that they did not (and in fact were not allowed) to 
provide labor or management to the partnership. 
Second, with regard to unlimited partners, our results suggest that these partners received better 
terms (lower capital contributions, higher profit shares, higher median salaries) when they were 
partners in limited firms as opposed to unlimited firms.  This is consistent with positive selection over 
unobserved dimensions such as management ability and productivity.  Such a finding is expected given 
that investors who cannot provide management ability or productivity (limited liability partners) are 
more likely to trust able people to manage the firm. 
Taken together, these findings help to illuminate the internal logic of limited versus unlimited 
partnership in Rio de Janeiro, as well as the main differences between types of partners.  Beyond this, 
we also attempt to assess the effect of a major institutional reform on the contract terms received by 
limited and unlimited liability partners.  Beginning in the 1880s, the joint-stock company emerged as a 
major alternative vehicle for investment and business organization.  This process underwent a sharp 
institutional shock with the reforms of 1890, after which many more joint-stock companies were      25
formed in a context of easy credit and rapidly expanding money supply.  Under these conditions, we 
find that limited partners post reform received lower salaries. This finding suggests that limited 
partners could now diversify their portfolios by investing their money in various joint stock companies, 
thus receiving insurance previously only available by withdrawing a salary from their partnership.  
Moreover, we find evidence that, compared with the unlimited partner in unlimited firms, the 
unlimited partner in limited firms improved his terms post reform, suggesting that limited partners may 
have become more selective after the reforms and only entered partnerships with exceptionally 
productive unlimited partners.  
 
      26
References 
Abramitzky Ran. “The Limits of Equality: Insights from the Israeli Kibbutz.” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics,123 no. 3. (2008): 1111-1159. 
 
Almanak Administrativo, Mercantil e Industrial do Rio de Janeiro [ Almanak Laemmert].  Rio de 
Janeiro: Laemmert & C. 
 
Barman, Roderick. Citizen Emperor: Pedro II and the Making of Brazil, 1825-91.  Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1999. 
 
Brazil, Código Comercial, Lei nº 556, de 25 de junho de 1850. 
 
Brazil, Diretoria Geral de Estadistica, Recenseamento da Populacao do Imperio do Brasil a que se 
Procedeu no Dia 18 de Agosto de 1872. 
 
Bodenhorn, Howard. “Partnership and Hold-Up in Early America.” NBER Working Paper Series, 
number w8814, 2002. 
 
Catão, Luis A. V. “A new wholesale price index for Brazil during the period 1870-1913.” Revista 
Brasileira de Economia, 46 no. 4. (1992): 519-533.  
 
Costa, Salustiano Orlando de Araujo.  Codigo Commercial do Imperio do Brazil.  Rio de Janeiro: 
Laemmert & C., 1886. 
 
da Costa, Emilia Viotti. The Brazilian Empire, Myths and Histories. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1985. 
 
Frank, Zephyr L.  Dutra's World: Wealth and Family in Nineteenth-Century Rio de Janeiro. 
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2004. 
 
Goirand, Leopold.  The French Code of Commerce and Most Usual Commercial Laws with a 
Theoretical and Practical Summary.  London: Stevens and Sons, 1880. 
 
Gómez-Galvarriato, Aurora, and Aldo Musacchio. “Larger Menus and Entrepreneurial Appetite: An 
Empirical Investigation of Organizational Choice in Mexico, 1886–1910.” Working Paper, 
Harvard Business School, 2008. 
 
Graham, Richard. Britain and the Onset of Modernization in Brazil, 1850-1914. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1968. 
 
Guinanne, Timothy, Ron Harris, Naomi Lamoreaux, and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal. “Putting the 
Corporation in its Place.” Enterprise and Society 8, no. 3 (2007): 687-729. 
 
Haber, Stephen H. “Financial Markets and Industrial Development: A Comparative Study of 
Governmental Regulation, Financial Innovation, and Industrial Structure in Brazil and Mexico, 1840-
1930.” In How Latin America Fell Behind, edited by Stephen H. Haber, 146-178. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1997. 
      27
Hilt, Eric, and Katherine O’Banion. “The Limited Partnership in New York, 1822-1858: Partnerships 
without Kinship.” Journal of Economic History (2009): forthcoming. 
 
Karasch, Mary. Slave Life in Rio de Janeiro, 1808–1850. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987. 
 
Kessler, Amalia D. “Limited Liability in Context: Lessons from the French Origins of the American 
Limited Partnership.” Journal of Legal Studies 32, no. 2 (2003): 511-48. 
 
Kim, Duol. “The Popularity of Partnerships in United States Manufacturing during the Nineteenth 
Century.” Working Paper. Department of Economics, University of California, Davis. 2003. 
 
Kim, Duol. “The Next Best Thing to Getting Married: Partnerships among the Jewelry Manufacturers 
in the Providence/Attleboro Area during the Nineteenth Century.” Enterprise and Society 8, no. 1. 
(2007): 106-135. 
 
Lamoreaux, Naomi R. Insider Lending: Banks, Personal Connections, and Economic Development in 
Industrial New England. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
 
Lamoreaux, Naomi R. “The Partnership Form of Organization: Its Popularity in Early-Nineteenth- 
Century Boston.” In Entrepreneurs: The Boston Business Community, 1750-1850, ed. Conrad E. 
Wright and Katheryn P. Viens, 269-95. Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1997. 
 
Lamoreaux, Naomi R. “Constructing Firms: Partnerships and Alternative Contractual Arrangements in 
Early-Nineteenth-Century American Business.” Business and Economic History, 24 (1995): 43–71. 
 
Lamoreaux, Naomi R. and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal. “Legal Regime and Contractual Flexibility: A 
Comparison of Business’s Organizational Choices in France and the United States during the Era of 
Industrialization.” American Law and Economics Review, 7, no. 1. (2005): 28-61. 
 
Lamoreaux, Naomi R. and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal. “Contractual Tradeoffs and SMEs Choice of 
Organizational From: A View from U.S. and French History.” NBER Working Paper No. 12455, 2006. 
 
Lamoreaux, Naomi R. and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal. “Corporate Governance and the Plight of Minority 
Shareholders in the United States before the Great Depression.” NBER Working Paper No. 10900, 
2006. 
 
Levy, Maria Bárbara. História financeira do Brasil colonial. Rio de Janeiro: IBMEC, 1979. 
 
Lobo, Eulalia Maria Lahmeyer. História do Rio de Janeiro: Do Capital Comercial ao Capital 
Industrial e Financeiro. Rio de Jeneiro: IBMEC, 1978. 
 
Musacchio, Aldo.  “Law and Finance in Historical Perspective: Politics, Bankruptcy Law, and 
Corporate Governance in Brazil, 1850–2002.” The Journal of Economic History, 67 no. 2. (2007): 
503-506. 
 
Musacchio, Aldo.  “Law and Finance in Historical Perspective: Politics, Bankruptcy Law, and 
Corporate Governance in Brazil, 1850–2002.” PhD dissertation. Stanford University, 2005. 
 
Rodman, John. The commercial code of France with the motives, or Discourses of the counselors of      28
state, delivered before the legislative body, illustrative of the principles and provisions of the code By 
France. C. Wiley, printer, 1814. 
 
Summerhill, William. Order Against Progress: Government, Foreign Investment, and Railroads in 
Brazil, 1854-1913. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003. 
 
Sweigart, Joseph. Coffee Factorage and the Emergence of a Brazilian Capital Market, 1850-1888. 
New York: Garland, 1987. 
 
Triner, Gail. Banking and Economic Development: Brazil, 1889-1930. New York: Palgrave, 2000. 
 
von der Weid, Elisabeth. O fia da meada: estratégia de expansão de uma indústria textile. Rio de 
Janeiro: FCRB-CNI, 1986. 
 
Manuscript Archives 
Arquivo Nacional, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 
Junta Comercial: Livros de Registros and Sociedades Anonimas 
Arquivo Geral da Cidade, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 





 1870 1888 1891
Variable Mean Min. Max. Mean Mean Mean
(Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.)
Limited Liability Firm 0.27 01 0.17 0.33 0.32
(0.44) (0.37) (0.47) (0.47)
Family Firm 0.16 0 1 0.16 0.17 0.15
(0.36) (0.36) (0.37) (0.36)
Fraction Portuguese 0.62 010.70 0.66 0.44
(0.42) (0.38) (0.40) (0.44)
Number of Partners 2.47 2 9 2.32 2.40 2.74
(0.86) (0.56) (0.65) (1.26)
Equal Share 0.44 0 1 0.37 0.52 0.46
(0.50) (0.48) (0.50) (0.50)
Time Delimitation 0.82 0 1 0.94 0.76 0.71
(0.38) (0.23) (0.43) (0.45)
Herfindahl: Capital 0.52 0 1 0.55 0.50 0.49
(0.16) (0.16) (0.13) (0.18)
  Capital (1870 Mil-Reis) 69,864 762 874,298 48,342 67,573 102,592
(122,744) (88,994) (97,260) (172,977)
Dry Goods Industry 0.13 0 1 0.16 0.13 0.09
(0.34) (0.37) (0.33) (0.28)
Cloth Merchant 0.11 0 1 0.14 0.11 0.08
(0.32) (0.35) (0.32) (0.27)
Broker Commission 0.16 0 1 0.12 0.16 0.22
(0.37) (0.33) (0.37) (0.41)
Log (Firm Capital) 10.18 6.64 13.68 9.93 10.21 10.49
(1.44) (1.31) (1.45) (1.54)
Observations 263 215 188
Notes: "Equal Share" is a dummy variable with the value 1 if all partners equally share profits and zero otherwise. "Herfindahl Capital"
measures the concentration of capital contribution, equaling the sum of ci
2 for all partners in the firm, where ci is the capital share contributed
by partner i out of total capital contributed by all partners. All variables with "Firm Capital" are in 1870 Mil-Reis according to an index for
wholesale prices in Brazil for 1870-1913. 
TABLE 1
Summary Statistics of Firm-Level Data
All Years
666
29Variable Mean Min. Max. Mean Min. Max. P-value
(Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.)
Family Firm 0.20 0 1 0.14 0 1 0.0515
(0.40) (0.35)
Fraction Portuguese 0.50 0 1 0.66 0 1 <0.0001
(0.42) (0.41)
Number of Partners 2.93 2 9 2.30 2 6 <0.0001
(1.22) (0.61)
Equal Share 0.34 0 1 0.48 0 1 0.0013
(0.47) (0.50)
Time Delimitation 0.81 0 1 0.82 0 1 0.6310
(0.40) (0.38)
Herfindahl: Capital 0.49 0 1 0.53 0 1 0.0043
(0.20) (0.14)
Firm Capital (1870 Mil-Reis) 96,402 1,918 874,298 60,258 762 874,298 0.0008
(136,111) (116,194)
Dry Goods Industry 0.07 0 1 0.15 0 1 0.0099
(0.26) (0.36)
Cloth Merchant 0.14 0 1 0.11 0 1 0.2949
(0.34) (0.31)
Broker Commission 0.24 0 1 0.13 0 1 0.0006
(0.43) (0.34)
Log (Firm Capital) 10.63 7.07 13.95 9.90 6.15 13.95 <0.0001
(1.36) (1.48)
Observations 489
Notes: "Equal Share" is a dummy variable with the value 1 if all partners equally share profits and zero otherwise. "Herfindahl Capital" measures the
concentration of capital contribution, equaling the sum of ci
2 for all partners in the firm, where ci is the capital share contributed by partner i out of total
capital contributed by all partners. All variables relating to capital contribution are in 1870 Mil-Reis according to an index for wholesale prices in
Brazil for 1870-1913. Standard errors are in parenthesis. "P-value" represents the p-value for the T-test for the null hypothesis of equality between the
two means for the variable. 
TABLE 2
Summary Statistics of Firm-Level Data by Firm Type: All Years
177
Limited Firms Unlimited Firms
301870 1888 1891
Variable Mean Min. Max. Observations Mean Mean Mean
(Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.)
Any Profit Received 0.99 01 1,476 N/A 1 0.98
(0.07) (0.00) (0.13)
Profit Share 0.39 0 1 931 N/A 0.41 0.37
(0.15) (0.13) (0.16)
Normalized Profit Share -0.01 00931 N/A -0.01 -0.01
(0.09) (0.08) (0.10)
Any Salary Received 0.94 0 1 1,476 0.96 0.97 0.89
(0.23) (0.20) (0.16) (0.31)
  Salary (1870 Mil-Reis) 2,792 0 100,000 1,476 2,095 3,405 2,974
(3,953) (4,728) (3,335) (3,369)
Log(Salary) 7.11 0 11.51 1,476 6.89 7.57 6.86
(1.97) (1.70) (1.53) (2.55)
Any Capital Share 0.97 0 1 1,476 0.96 0.98 0.97
(0.18) (0.21) (0.14) (0.17)
Capital Contribution (1870 Mil-Reis) 26,880 0 568,293 1,476 18,784 29,023 34,482
(46,410) (36,620) (44,282) (56,859)
Log (Capital Contribution) 9.05 0 13.25 1,476 8.62 9.26 9.33
(2.14) (2.26) (1.92) (2.14)
Partner Capital Share 0.41 0 1 1,476 0.43 0.41 0.38
(0.22) (0.23) (0.19) (0.22)
Normalized Capital Share 0.00 -1 1 1,476 -0.01 00
(0.19) (0.22) (0.16) (0.18)
Profit Share / Capital Share 1.17 0 10 908 N/A 1.18 1.17
(0.91) (0.88) (0.95)
Limited Partner 0.12 0 1 1,476 0.06 0.15 0.17
(0.33) (0.25) (0.36) (0.37)
Brazilian National 0.26 01 1,476 0.19 0.28 0.34
(0.44) (0.39) (0.45) (0.47)
Family Member 0.14 0 1 1,476 0.14 0.15 0.12
(0.35) (0.35) (0.36) (0.32)
Notes: All partner-level summary statistics exclude observations with missing values for any of the variables under review, except for the variable "Profit Share / Capital
Share", which is not included in the regression analysis. This is to ensure a consistent sample across all regression analysis. "Any Profit Received", "Any Salary Received",
"Any Capital Share" are dummy variables receiving the value 1 if the profit / salary / capital contribution of the partner is positive and zero otherwise. "Normalized Profit
Share" is equal to [si - 1/N], where si is the share of profits received by partner i and N is the number of partners in the firm. "Normalized Capital Share" is equal to [ci -
1/N], where ci is the share of capital contributed by partner i, out of total capital contributed to the firm, and N is the number of partners in the firm. All variables relating to
salaries or capital contribution are in 1870 Mil-Reis according to an index for wholesale prices in Brazil for 1870-1913. All variables related to profits were not available for
1870 and are calculated only for 1888 and 1891. 
TABLE 3
Summary Statistics of Partner-Level Data
All Years
31(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS Probit OLS OLS OLS
All Years All Years 1870 1888 1891
Family Firm −0.018 −0.021 0.020 −0.107 −0.043
(0.051) (0.052) (0.069) (0.087) (0.095)
Fraction of Portuguese −0.079* −0.085* −0.094 −0.124 −0.030
(0.044) (0.045) (0.064) (0.082) (0.079)
Numbers of Partners 0.167*** 0.177*** 0.198*** 0.296*** 0.134***
(0.027) (0.040) (0.054) (0.065) (0.035)
Equal Share −0.034 −0.031 0.037 −0.075 −0.063
(0.037) (0.040) (0.050) (0.071) (0.074)
Time Delimitation 0.014 0.011 -0.019 −0.043 0.075
(0.045) (0.046) (0.099) (0.073) (0.072)
Herfindahl: Capital 0.278* 0.317** 0.203 0.527* 0.278
(0.145) (0.146) (0.164) (0.281) (0.223)
Log (Firm Capital) 0.007 0.009 0.015 0.006 −0.007
(0.014) (0.016) (0.023) (0.028) (0.028)
Dry Goods Industry −0.024 −0.033 0.008 −0.044 −0.087
(0.043) (0.056) (0.066) (0.097) (0.121)
Cloth Merchant 0.058 0.063 0.006 0.043 0.187
(0.058) (0.062) (0.067) (0.099) (0.122)
Broker Commission 0.091* 0.081 −0.057 0.044 0.220***
(0.052) (0.054) (0.075) (0.094) (0.083)
1891 Dummy 0.079* 0.091*
(0.044) (0.052)
1888 Dummy 0.168*** 0.187***
(0.040) (0.047)
R-Squared 0.154 0.101 0.185 0.175
Observations 666 666 263 215 188
Notes: "Equal Share" is a dummy variable with the value 1 if all partners equally share profits and zero otherwise. "Herfindahl 
Capital" measures the concentration of capital contribution, equaling the sum of ci
2 for all partners in the firm, where ci is the
capital share contributed by partner i out of total capital contributed by all partners. All variables relating to capital contribution
are in 1870 Mil-Reis according to an index for wholesale prices in Brazil for 1870-1913. 
Columns (1) and (3)-(5) are estimated using ordinary least squares. Column (2) is a probit regression, and the estimation
represent marginal effects. T-test significant at ***1%, **5%, *10%.
TABLE 4
Predicting Limited Firms
32(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS Median FE
Limited Partner -0.026** -0.090*** -0.083*** -0.074*** -0.084***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.004) (0.021)
1891 Dummy -0.001 0.001 -0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003)
Existing Earlier -0.006 -0.009* -0.014***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
Log (Firm Capital) -0.004 -0.006 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Number of Partners 0.001 0.004 -0.002*
(0.003) (0.004) (0.001)
Time Delimitation -0.008 -0.008 -0.015***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004)
Broker Commission -0.005 -0.006 -0.014***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004)
Brazilian National -0.001 -0.002 -0.006* 0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.022)
Family Member -0.013 -0.014 -0.011** -0.026
(0.015) (0.015) (0.005) (0.047)
Normalized Capital Share 0.311*** 0.305*** 0.252*** 0.308***
(0.050) (0.050) (0.010) (0.062)
Log (Salary) 0.004* 0.002** 0.005
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004)
R-Squared 0.019 0.329 0.336 0.362
Observations 350 350 350 350 350
Notes: All partner-level analysis excludes observations with missing values for any of the variables under review. This is to
ensure a consistent sample across all types of analysis. The analysis is limited to partners in limited firms from 1888 and 1891 in
the dataset. The dependent variable is "Normalized Profit Share", equal to [si- 1/N], where si is the share of profits received by
partner i and N is the number of partners in the firm. "Normalized Capital Share" is similarly calculated, equal to [ci - 1/N],
where ci is now the share of capital contributed by partner i, out of total capital contributed by all partners, and N is the number
of partners in the firm. All variables relating to salaries and capital contribution are in 1870 Mil-Reis according to an index for
wholesale prices in Brazil for 1870-1913. Columns (1)-(3) are estimated using ordinary least squares, column (4) is estimated
using median regression, and column (5) is estimated using fixed effects at the firm level. 
TABLE 5
Comparing Limited and Unlimited Partners in Limited Firms: Predicting Normalized Profit Share
Standard errors are in parentheses. For columns (1)-(3) and (5) standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered at the
firm level. T-test significant at ***1%, **5%, *10%.
33(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS OLS Median FE
Limited Partner -1.945*** -1.656*** -1.457*** -1.700*** -0.079 -1.316***
(0.445) (0.326) (0.328) (0.419) (0.092) (0.407)
1891 Dummy -0.671** -0.653** -0.660** -0.312***
(0.268) (0.265) (0.265) (0.087)
Existing Earlier 0.718** 0.726** 0.724*** 0.169*
(0.277) (0.278) (0.273) (0.089)
Log (Firm Capital) 0.382** 0.502*** 0.426*** 0.717***
(0.158) (0.151) (0.137) (0.056)
Number of Partners -0.760*** -0.789*** -0.761*** -0.539***
(0.124) (0.124) (0.122) (0.038)
Time Delimitation -0.006 0.022 0.016 0.059
(0.279) (0.283) (0.279) (0.096)
Broker Commission 0.309 0.285 0.291 -0.033
(0.315) (0.312) (0.308) (0.099)
Brazilian National 0.14 0.146 0.155 0.057 -0.703
(0.296) (0.291) (0.293) (0.088) (0.570)
Family Member 0.269 0.336 0.309 -0.064 0.665
(0.227) (0.236) (0.233) (0.124) (1.013)
Log (Capital Contribution) 0.023 -0.05 -0.033 -0.037
(0.030) (0.037) (0.023) (0.091)
Normalized Capital Share 0.721
(1.022)
Normalized Profit Share 4.121*** 3.027* 2.956*** 3.818*
(1.423) (1.720) (0.480) (1.952)
R-Squared 0.126 0.341 0.358 0.358 0.182
Observations 350 350 350 350 350 350
Notes: All partner-level analysis excludes observations with missing values for any of the variables under review. This is to ensure a consistent
sample across all types of analysis. The analysis is limited to partners in limited firms from 1888 and 1891 in the dataset. "Normalized Capital
Share" is equal to [ci - 1/N], where ci is the share of capital contributed by partner i, out of total capital contributed by all partners, and N is the
number of partners in the firm. "Normalized Profit Share" is equal to [si - 1/N], where si is now the share of profits received by partner i and N is
the number of partners in the firm. All variables relating to salaries and capital contribution are in 1870 Mil-Reis according to an index for
wholesale prices in Brazil for 1870-1913. Columns (1)-(4) are estimated using ordinary least squares, column (5) is estimated using median
regression, and column (6) is estimated using fixed effects at the firm level. Standard errors are in parentheses. For columns (1)-(4) and (6) standard
errors are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered at the firm level. T-test significant at ***1%, **5%, *10%. 
TABLE 6
Comparing Limited and Unlimited Partners in Limited Firms: Predicting Log Salary
34(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS Median FE
Limited Partner 0.204*** 0.209*** 0.238*** 0.200*** 0.251***
(0.027) (0.026) (0.023) (0.012) (0.029)
1891 Dummy -0.003 0.001 0.020
(0.005) (0.008) (0.017)
Existing Earlier 0.006 0.008 0.007
(0.006) (0.007) (0.017)
Log (Firm Capital) 0.001 0.003 0.009
(0.003) (0.005) (0.008)
Number of Partners -0.007*** -0.004 -0.013*
(0.003) (0.005) (0.007)
Time Delimitation 0.000 0.008 0.016
(0.006) (0.008) (0.018)
Broker Commission 0.016** 0.016* 0.012
(0.006) (0.008) (0.013)
Brazilian National -0.009 -0.005 -0.012 0.004
(0.015) (0.013) (0.017) (0.046)
Family Member 0.003 0.014 0.030 0.038
(0.013) (0.020) (0.024) (0.073)
Log (Salary) 0.003 0.004 0.003
(0.004) (0.003) (0.008)
Normalized Profit Share  0.983*** 1.031*** 1.074***
(0.110) (0.085) (0.144)
R-Squared 0.277 0.282 0.505 0.54
Observations 350 350 350 350 350
Notes: All partner-level analysis excludes observations with missing values for any of the variables under review. This is to
ensure a consistent sample across all types of analysis. The analysis is limited to partners in limited firms from 1888 and 1891 in
the dataset. The dependent variable is "Normalized Capital Share", equal to [ci - 1/N], where ci is the share of capital
contributed by partner i, out of total capital contributed by all partners, and N is the number of partners in the firm. "Normalized
Profit Share" is similarly calculated, equal to [si - 1/N], where si is now the share of profits received by partner i,and N is the
number of partners in the firm. All variables relating to salaries and capital contribution are in 1870 Mil-Reis according to an
index for wholesale prices in Brazil for 1870-1913. Columns (1)-(3) are estimated using ordinary least squares, column (4) is
estimated using median regression, and column (5) is estimated using fixed effects at the firm level. 
TABLE 7
Comparing Limited and Unlimited Partners in Limited Firms: Predicting Normalized Capital Share
Standard errors are in parentheses. For columns (1)-(3) and (5) standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered at the 
firm level. T-test significant at ***1%, **5%, *10%.
35(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS Median
Limited Liability Firm 0.005 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.090***
(0.006) (0.021) (0.021) (0.000)
1891 Dummy 0.002 0.004 0.000***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.000)
Existing Earlier -0.008* -0.008* 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.000)
Log (Firm Capital) -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.000***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.000)
Number of Partners 0.006*** 0.008*** -0.000***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000)
Number of Partners * -0.013** -0.014** -0.020***
Limited Firm (0.006) (0.006) (0.000)
Time Delimitation -0.005 -0.005 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.000)
Broker Commission 0.001 0.003 0.000**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.000)
Brazilian National -0.009* -0.010** -0.000***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.000)
Family Member 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.006) (0.006) (0.000)
Normalized Capital Share 0.393*** 0.390*** 0.400***
(0.031) (0.030) (0.000)
Log (Salary) 0.004* 0.000**
(0.002) (0.000)
R-Squared 0.001 0.467 0.47
Observations 783 783 783 783
Notes: All partner-level analysis excludes observations with missing values for any of the variables under
review. This is to ensure a consistent sample across all types of analysis. The analysis is limited to the
unlimited partners from 1888 and 1891 in the dataset. The dependent variable is "Normalized Profit Share",
equal to [si - 1/N], where si is the share of profits received by partner i and N is the number of partners in
the firm. "Normalized Capital Share" is similarly calculated, equal to [ci - 1/N], where ci is now the share of
capital contributed by partner i, out of total capital contributed by all partners, and N is the number of
partners in the firm. All variables relating to salaries and capital contribution are in 1870 Mil-Reis according
to an index for wholesale prices in Brazil for 1870-1913.
Columns (1)-(3) are estimated using ordinary least squares and column (4) is estimated using median
regression. Standard errors are in parentheses. For columns (1)-(3) standard errors are heteroscedasticity
robust and clustered at the firm level. T-test significant at ***1%, **5%, *10%.
TABLE 8
Comparing Unlimited Partners in Limited vs. Unlimited Firms: Predicting Normalized 
Profit Share
36(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS OLS Median
Limited Liability Firm 0.444*** 0.497** 0.452* 0.478* -0.077*
(0.146) (0.247) (0.250) (0.267) (0.039)
1891 Dummy -0.414*** -0.420*** -0.417*** -0.128***
(0.141) (0.142) (0.142) (0.033)
Existing Earlier 0.089 0.101 0.103 0.059
(0.208) (0.210) (0.209) (0.036)
Log (Firm Capital) 0.445*** 0.494*** 0.466*** 0.533***
(0.083) (0.077) (0.076) (0.017)
Number of Partners -0.526*** -0.549*** -0.540*** -0.181***
(0.189) (0.187) (0.190) (0.020)
Time Delimitation -0.063 -0.049 -0.049 0.025
(0.147) (0.148) (0.148) (0.036)
Broker Commission -0.297 -0.312 -0.31 -0.027
(0.272) (0.271) (0.271) (0.043)
Brazilian National 0.245 0.257 0.26 0.199***
(0.188) (0.189) (0.188) (0.036)
Family Member -0.235 -0.242 -0.244 -0.220***
(0.240) (0.239) (0.239) (0.047)
Log (Capital Contribution) 0.017 -0.026 0.011
(0.023) (0.022) (0.011)
Normalized Capital Share 0.035
(0.420)
Normalized Profit Share 1.891** 1.674** 2.006***
(0.734) (0.849) (0.189)
R-Squared 0.015 0.196 0.205 0.205
Observations 783 783 783 783 783
Notes: All partner-level analysis excludes observations with missing values for any of the variables under review. This is to
ensure a consistent sample across all types of analysis. 
The analysis is limited to the unlimited partners from 1888 and 1891 in the dataset. "Normalized Capital Share" is equal to [ci - 
1/N], where ci is the share of capital contributed by partner i, out of total capital contributed by all partners, and N is the
number of partners in the firm. "Normalized Profit Share" is equal to [si- 1/N], where si is now the share of profits received by
partner i and N is the number of partners in the firm. All variables relating to salaries and capital contribution are in 1870 Mil-
Reis according to an index for wholesale prices in Brazil for 1870-1913. 
Columns (1)-(4) are estimated using ordinary least squares and column (5) is estimated using median regression. Standard errors
are in parentheses. For columns (1)-(4) standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered at the firm level. T-test
significant at ***1%, **5%, *10%.
TABLE 9
Comparing Unlimited Partners in Limited vs. Unlimited Firms: Predicting Log Salary
37(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS Median
Limited Liability Firm -0.086*** -0.216*** -0.213*** -0.169***
(0.010) (0.035) (0.036) (0.000)
1891 Dummy -0.004 -0.005 0.000***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.000)
Existing Earlier -0.004 0.007 -0.000***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.000)
Log (Firm Capital) 0.005** 0.008*** 0.000***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000)
Number of Partners -0.006** -0.010*** -0.000***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.000)
Number of Partners * 0.040*** 0.037*** 0.030***
Limited Firm (0.009) (0.010) (0.000)
Time Delimitation -0.008 0.002 -0.000***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.000)
Broker Commission 0.016** 0.007 0.000**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.000)
Brazilian National -0.004 0.009 0.000***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.000)
Family Member 0.017** 0.009 -0.000***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.000)
Log (Salary) -0.001 -0.000***
(0.002) (0.000)
Normalized Profit Share  1.174*** 1.150***
(0.062) (0.000)
R-Squared 0.054 0.077 0.502
Observations 783 783 783 783
Notes: All partner-level analysis excludes observations with missing values for any of the variables under
review. This is to ensure a consistent sample across all types of analysis. The analysis is limited to the
unlimited partners from 1888 and 1891 in the dataset. The dependent variable is "Normalized Capital Share",
equal to [ci - 1/N], where ci is the share of capital contributed by partner i, out of total capital contributed by
all partners, and N is the number of partners in the firm. "Normalized Profit Share" is similarly calculated,
equal to [si - 1/N], where si is now the share of profits received by partner i,and N is the number of partners
in the firm. All variables relating to salaries and capital contribution are in 1870 Mil-Reis according to an
index for wholesale prices in Brazil for 1870-1913.
Columns (1)-(3) are estimated using ordinary least squares and column (4) is estimated using median
regression. Standard errors are in parentheses. For columns (1)-(3) standard errors are heteroscedasticity
robust and clustered at the firm level. T-test significant at ***1%, **5%, *10%.
TABLE 10
Comparing Unlimited Partners in Limited vs. Unlimited Firms: Predicting Normalized 
Capital Share
38Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Family Member 0.012 0.007 0.046 -0.206 0.025 0.013
(0.016) (0.014) (0.403) (0.493) (0.020) (0.018)
1891 Dummy -0.008 -0.422 0.008
(0.009) (0.367) (0.008)
Existing Earlier -0.017* 0.703 0.013
(0.009) (0.585) (0.008)
Log (Firm Capital) -0.003 0.502 0.002
(0.003) (0.316) (0.003)
Number of Partners 0.007 -0.601* -0.001
(0.006) (0.315) (0.006)
Time Delimitation 0.007 -0.604* -0.003
(0.008) (0.328) (0.008)
Broker Commission 0.015** -0.873 -0.006
(0.007) (0.721) (0.011)
Brazilian National -0.012 0.913 0.002
(0.010) (0.601) (0.016)
Log (Capital Contribution) -0.118
(0.101)
Normalized Capital Share 0.371***
(0.075)
Normalized Profit Share 2.957*** 0.963***
(0.925) (0.143)
Log (Salary) 0.005** -0.001
(0.002) (0.004)
R-Squared 0.003 0.378 0.000 0.191 0.005 0.365
Observations 172 172 172 172 172 172
Notes: All partner-level analysis excludes observations with missing values for any of the variables under review. This is to ensure a
consistent sample across all types of analysis. The analysis is limited to partners in firms with family members from 1888 and 1891
in the dataset. "Normalized Capital Share" is equal to [ci - 1/N], where ci is the share of capital contributed by partner i, out of
total capital contributed by all partners, and N is the number of partners in the firm. "Normalized Profit Share" is similarly
calculated, equal to [si - 1/N], where si is now the share of profits received by partner i,and N is the number of partners in the firm.
All variables relating to salaries and capital contribution are in 1870 Mil-Reis according to an index for wholesale prices in Brazil
for 1870-1913. All columns are estimated using ordinary least squares. Standard errors are in parentheses, are heteroscedasticity
robust, and clustered at the firm level. T-test significant at ***1%, **5%, *10%.
TABLE 11
Comparing Family Members to Non-Members in Family Firms
Normalized Profit Share Normalized Capital Share Log Salary
39Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
OLS OLS Median FE OLS OLS Median FE OLS OLS Median FE
1891 * Limited Partner -0.036 -0.031 -0.005 -0.028 -1.471* -0.576 -0.292** -0.547 -0.02 0.028 -0.030 0.032
(0.025) (0.022) (0.007) (0.027) (0.793) (0.645) (0.138) (0.762) (0.053) (0.045) (0.022) (0.057)
Limited Partner -0.008 -0.069*** -0.073*** -0.072*** -1.191*** -1.443*** -0.013 -1.069** 0.214*** 0.226*** 0.218*** 0.237***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.006) -0.024 (0.383) (0.413) (0.098) (0.459) (0.033) (0.029) (0.015) (0.037)
1891 Dummy 0.011 0.013 -0.003 -0.483** -0.429* -0.217** 0.000 -0.009 0.030**
(0.011) (0.010) (0.005) (0.193) (0.217) (0.089) (0.021) (0.019) (0.014)
Additional  Controls No Yes Yes Yes  No Yes Yes Yes  No Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.029 0.343 0.368 0.185 0.361 0.187 0.278 0.507 0.542
Observations 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350
"Additional Controls" are: Existing Earlier, Log (Firm Capital), Number of Partners, Time Delimitation, Broker Commission, Brazilian National, Family Member in the OLS and median
regressions, and only Brazilian National and Family Member for the Fixed Effects regressions. For each dependent variable, "Additional Controls" also includes the two other dependent
variables listed above, except for column (7), where we include "Log(Capital Contirubtion)", instead of "Normalized Capital Share". For the OLS regression with "Log Salary" as the
dependent variable, we also ran the same regression as column (6), only with "Log(Capital Contribution)", instead of "Normalized Capital Share" as one of the control variables, in order
to compare the effect of the level of capital contribution on the salary level, and the results were similar to those reported in column (6). Standard errors are in parentheses. For columns
(1)-(2), (4), (5)-(6), (8), (9)-(10), and (12), standard erros are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered at the firm level. T-test significant at ***1%, **5%, *10%.
Notes: All partner-level analysis excludes observations with missing values for any of the variables under review. This is to ensure a consistent sample across all types of analysis. The
analysis is limited to limited firms from 1888 and 1891 in the dataset. All variables relating to salaries and capital contribution are in 1870 Mil-Reis according to an index for wholesale
prices in Brazil for 1870-1913. "Normalized Capital Share" is equal to [ci - 1/N], where ci is the share of capital contributed by partner i, out of total capital contributed by all partners,
and N is the number of partners in the firm. "Normalized Profit Share" is similarly calculated, equal to [si - 1/N], where si is now the share of profits received by partner i,and N is the
number of partners in the firm. Columns (1)-(2), (5)-(6), and (9)-(10) are estimated using ordinary least squares, columns (3), (7) and (11) are estimated using median regression, and
columns (4), (8) and (12) are estimated using fixed effects at the firm level. 
TABLE 12
Difference-in-Differences 1888-1891: The Effect of the Reforms on Limited vs. Unlimited Partners in Limited Firms
Normalized Profit Share Normalized Capital Share Log Salary
40Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS OLS Median FE OLS OLS Median FE
1888 * Limited Partner −0.756 −0.784 −0.056 −0.637 -0.106 −0.106 −0.024 -0.111
(0.494) (0.492) (0.073) (0.504) (0.064) (0.065) (0.048) (0.069)
Limited Partner −0.434 −0.436 0.050 −0.514 0.320*** 0.327*** 0.239*** 0.342***
(0.311) (0.362) (0.062) (0.336) (0.055) (0.056) (0.039) (0.061)
1888 Dummy 0.832*** 0.573** 0.356*** 0.041 0.041 −0.015
(0.298) (0.279) (0.049) (0.027) (0.027) (0.033)
Additional  Controls No Yes Yes Yes  No Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.075 0.172 0.156 0.357 0.366 0.376
Observations 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276
"Additional Controls" are: Existing Earlier, Log (Firm Capital), Number of Partners, Time Delimitation, Broker Commission,
Brazilian National, and Family Member in the OLS and median regressions, and only Brazilian National and Family Member for the
fixed effects regressions. For each dependent variable, "Additional Controls" also includes the other dependent variable listed above.
For the regression with "Log Salary" as the dependent variable, we also ran the same regression as column (2), only with "Log(Capital
Contribution)", instead of "Normalized Capital Share" as one of the control variables, in order to compare the effect of the level of
capital contribution on the salary level, and the results were similar to those reported in column (2). Standard errors are in parentheses.
For columns (1)-(2), (4), (5)-(6), and (8), standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered at the firm level. T-test significant
at ***1%, **5%, *10%.
Notes: All partner-level analysis excludes observations with missing values for any of the variables under review. This is to ensure a
consistent sample across all types of analysis. The analysis is limited to limited firms from 1870 and 1888 in the dataset. "Normalized
Capital Share" is equal to [ci - 1/N], where ci is the share of capital contributed by partner i, out of total capital contributed by all
partners, and N is the number of partners in the firm. All variables relating to salaries and capital contribution are in 1870 Mil-Reis
according to an index for wholesale prices in Brazil for 1870-1913. Profit data at the partner level were not available for 1870.
Columns (1)-(2) and (5)-(6) are estimated using ordinary least squares, columns (3) and (7) are estimated using median regression, and
columns (4) and (8) are estimated using fixed effects at the firm level. 
TABLE 13
Difference-in-Differences 1870-1888: Comparing Limited vs. Unlimited Partners in Limited Firms
Log Salary Normalized Capital Share
41Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
OLS OLS Median OLS OLS Median OLS OLS Median
1891 * Limited Firm 0.014 0.020* 0.007*** -0.05 0.027 -0.062 0.000 -0.034* -0.007***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.000) (0.295) (0.282) (0.072) (0.021) (0.019) (0.000)
Limited Firm -0.001 0.079*** 0.090*** 0.460*** 0.466** -0.064 -0.087*** -0.206*** -0.184***
(0.007) (0.021) (0.000) (0.130) (0.203) (0.052) (0.013) (0.035) (0.000)
1891 Dummy -0.003 -0.001 0.000*** -0.434* -0.424** -0.123*** 0.000 0.003 0.000***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.000) (0.224) (0.189) (0.037) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000)
Additional  Controls No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.002 0.473 0.035 0.205 0.054 0.504
Observations 783 783 783 783 783 783 783 783 783
"Additional Controls" are: Existing Earlier, Log (Firm Capital), Number of Partners, Time Delimitation, Broker Commission, Brazilian National,
Family Member in the OLS and median regressions, and only Brazilian National and Family Member for the Fixed Effects regressions. For each
dependent variable, "Additional Controls" also includes the two other dependent variables listed above. For the regression with "Log Salary" as
the dependent variable, we also ran the same regression as column (5), only with "Log(Capital Contribution)", instead of "Normalized Capital
Share" as one of the control variables, in order to compare the effect of the level of capital contribution on the salary level, and the results were
similar to those reported in column (5). Standard errors are in parentheses. For columns (1)-(2), (4)-(5), and (7)-(8), standard errors are
heteroscedasticity robust and clustered at the firm level. T-test significant at ***1%, **5%, *10%.
Notes: All partner-level analysis excludes observations with missing values for any of the variables under review. This is to ensure a consistent
sample across all types of analysis. The analysis is limited to limited partners from 1888 and 1891 in the dataset. "Normalized Capital Share" is
equal to [ci - 1/N], where ci is the share of capital contributed by partner i, out of total capital contributed by all partners, and N is the number
of partners in the firm. "Normalized Profit Share" is similarly calculated, equal to [si - 1/N], where si is now the share of profits received by
partner i,and N is the number of partners in the firm. All variables relating to salaries and capital contribution are in 1870 Mil-Reis according to
an index for wholesale prices in Brazil for 1870-1913. 
Columns (1)-(2), (4)-(5), and (7)-(8) are estimated using ordinary least squares and columns (3), (6) and (9) are estimated using median
regression. 
TABLE 14
Difference-in-Differences 1888-1891: The Effect of the Reforms on Unlimited Partners in Limited vs. Unlimited Firms
Normalized Profit Share Normalized Capital Share Log Salary
42Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS Median OLS OLS Median
1888 * Limited Firm 0.107 −0.003 −0.126 0.035 0.028 0.014***
(0.324) (0.287) (0.096) (0.027) (0.025) (0.000)
Limited Firm 0.354 0.236 0.142* −0.122*** −0.317*** −0.306***
(0.297) (0.241) (0.077) (0.024) (0.062) (0.000)
1888 Dummy 0.725*** 0.572*** 0.396*** 0.006** 0.004 -0.000***
(0.131) (0.101) (0.043) (0.003) (0.005) (0.000)
Additional Controls No Yes  Yes  No Yes  Yes 
R-Squared 0.086 0.322 0.043 0.057
Observations 924 924 924 924 924 924
"Additional Controls" are: Existing Earlier, Log (Firm Capital), Number of Partners, Time Delimitation, Broker Commission,
Brazilian National, and Family Member in the OLS and median regressions, and only Brazilian National and Family Member for
the fixed effects regressions. For each dependent variable, "Additional Controls" also includes the other dependent variable listed
above. For the regression with "Log Salary" as the dependent variable, we also ran the same regression as column (2), only with
"Log(Capital Contribution)", instead of "Normalized Capital Share" as one of the control variables, in order to compare the effect
of the level of capital contribution on the salary level, and the results were similar to those reported in column (2). Standard errors
are in parentheses. For columns (1)-(2) and (4)-(5) standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered at the firm level. T-
test significant at ***1%, **5%, *10%.
Notes: All partner-level analysis excludes observations with missing values for any of the variables under review. This is to
ensure a consistent sample across all types of analysis. The analysis is limited to unlimited partners from 1870 and 1888 in the
dataset. Profit data at the partner level were not available for 1870. "Normalized Capital Share" is equal to [ci - 1/N], where ci is
the share of capital contributed by partner i, out of total capital contributed by all partners, and N is the number of partners in the
firm. All variables relating to salaries and capital contribution are in 1870 Mil-Reis according to an index for wholesale prices in
Brazil for 1870-1913. Columns (1)-(2) and (4)-(5) are estimated using ordinary least squares and columns (3) and (6) are
estimated using median regression. 
TABLE 15
Difference-in-Differences 1870-1888: Comparing Unlimited Partners in Limited vs. Unlimited Firms
Log Salary Normalized Capital Share
43